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Abstract:
The Swamping Argument – highlighted by Kvanvig (2003; 2010) – purports to show that the epistemic value of truth will always 
swamp  the epistemic value of any non-factive epistemic properties  (e.g. justification) so that these properties  can never add any 
epistemic value to an already-true belief. Consequently (and counter-intuitively), knowledge is never more epistemically valuable 
than mere true belief. We show that  the Swamping Argument fails. Parity of reasoning yields  the disastrous conclusion  that non-
factive epistemic properties – mostly saliently justification – are never epistemically valuable properties of a belief. We close by 
diagnosing why philosophers have been mistakenly attracted to the argument. 
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1.The Swamping Problem
Recent work by Jonathan Kvanvig (2003), Ward Jones (1997), Richard Swinburne (1999), Linda 
Zagzebski (2003), Duncan Pritchard (2009a) and others illuminates a particular problem for 
theorists of knowledge. The problem begins with the widely-held assumption that knowledge is 
more epistemically valuable (henceforth “e-valuable”) than mere true belief.1 This assumption gives 
rise to an ex ante constraint on the correct theory of knowledge: whatever conditions it places on 
knowledge (over and above the possession of true belief), a true belief that satisfies all of those 
conditions must turn out to be more e-valuable than a true belief that doesn’t.2  The problem is how 
to accommodate this ex ante constraint.
Failing to solve this problem provides the ground for an objection. Typically, this objection is 
levied against reliabilist  theories of knowledge,3  e.g. one according to which there is only one 
condition for knowledge over and above the possession of true belief: the condition that (put 
roughly) the belief must be reliably formed. However, the objection has wider scope. Any theorist 
who is to maintain the ex ante constraint must have some plausible explanation for why the e-value 
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1 As Kvanvig (2003) notes, the insight that knowledge is to be prized above mere true opinion (even if the former is no practically 
more useful than the latter) has its roots to Plato’s Meno.
2 Cf. Baehr (2009) for an argument against construing the value insight as an ex ante constraint on an analysis of knowledge.
3 See here Goldman (1992).
of knowledge is greater than that of merely  true belief. However the Swamping Argument allegedly 
shows that the value of knowledge collapses into the value of merely true belief. 
Our (novel) version of the Swamping Argument rests on three independently  plausible premises. 
A theorist could try to avoid the conclusion by  abandoning one of the premises, so we can usefully 
think of the Swamping Problem as a quadrilemma: one of the four theses that we will now discuss 
must be abandoned.4 
Think of the first, S1, as the value claim that motivates the ex ante constraint itself: that 
knowledge is more e-valuable than mere true belief.
(S1): Knowledge is more e-valuable than mere true belief.
Think of the second, S2, as a specification of the conditions under which a given belief state or 
process is e-valuable. A familiar position here individuates epistemic value from other values, e.g. 
aesthetic value, moral value.  This individuation appeals to a fundamental epistemic good, truth; 
something counts as e-valuable, by way of its connection to that good:
(S2): Any e-value conferred on a belief merely  by  that  belief having some non-factive property is 
instrumental value relative to the further epistemic good of true belief.
It is by  reference to S2 that one might explain why justification is e-valuable; because beliefs that 
are justified are, in the default case, true or alternatively more likely to be true than ones that aren’t. 
S2 squares with the idea that we want our beliefs to be justified because we want them to be true.
The third thesis gives a necessary condition for (S1) to be true. Say that a property is a 
component of knowledge if and only if necessarily, a belief that is knowledge has that property. The 
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4 Pritchard (2009a) construes the Swamping Problem as a trilemma. However, our version of the Swamping Thesis is exactly his 
version of the Swamping Thesis. 
idea is that  knowledge couldn’t be more e-valuable than mere true belief unless it has a component 
other than truth that contributes e-value:
(S3): If knowledge is more e-valuable than mere true belief, then there is a non-factive 
component of knowledge that, in instances of knowledge, adds e-value.
This thesis might be motivated by the thought that knowledge entails justification, and the 
additional e-value that knowledge has above and beyond the value of merely true belief is 
inextricably tied to (although perhaps not wholly or even partly explained by) the e-value that this 
justification brings with it in instances of knowledge.5
The fourth and final thesis is, following here Pritchard 2009a, what we may call the Swamping 
Thesis. This thesis claims: 
(S4) If the value of a property  possessed by an item is only  instrumental value relative to a 
further good and that good is already present in that item, then it can confer no additional value.
We’ll suggest some motivation for the Swamping Thesis in §2 before attacking the thesis in 
§§3-4.
With the four theses in place, we can construct the Swamping Argument. Let Ve be a function that 
inputs properties of a belief, and outputs the e-value contributed by  those properties. Let K be the 
property  of being knowledge, and T the property of being true. Let C be some arbitrary  non-factive 
component of knowledge. We can reason as follows: 
(i) C adds only instrumental e-value relative to the further epistemic good of truth.  (by S2)
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5 It is a virtue of this thesis that it has none of the following as consequences: (1) knowledge is factorable into its components (see 
Williamson (2000), (2) the e-value of knowledge is explained by the e-value of its components (rather than vice-versa), and (3) the e-
value of knowledge is the additive sum of the e-values of some of its components (taken individually).  
(ii) Therefore, Ve(T&C) = Ve(T). (by S4)
(iii)Therefore, no non-factive component adds e-value in instances of K. (by Universal 
Generalization)
(iv)Therefore, Ve(K) = Ve(T) (by S3)
The conclusion (iv) is simply the rejection of S1. If a theorist wants to maintain S1, she must 
reject S2, S3, or S4. But, each are taken to be independently  plausible and they jointly entail that S1 
is false, it is natural to conclude that knowledge is not more e-valuable than mere true belief. This is 
Kvanvig’s (2003) ultimate assessment (even though it is specifically  a reliabilist theory of 
knowledge that he has most often cited as an example of a theory that succumbs to the Swamping 
Problem).6  Alternatively, one might reject Kvanvig’s revisionist position and take versions of the 
Swamping Argument as a sort of challenge: a challenge to demonstrate how, on one’s own theory  of 
knowledge, the conclusion can be avoided.7  
Surprisingly, the Swamping Thesis itself appears to have gone almost entirely unchallenged. We 
think that this is a mistake. In §2, we will advance an argument that shows how the Swamping 
Thesis has, in conjunction with an equally  plausible thesis and S2, the apparently absurd 
implication that neither justification nor any other non-factive property  of beliefs ever confers 
additional e-value to beliefs. In §§3-4, we diagnose this problem; we explain why the Swamping 
Thesis should be rejected.
2.More Swamping
In this section, we will show that, S2 and the Swamping Thesis, combined with an equally 
plausible Swamping Thesis Complement, jointly  entail that no non-factive property of belief ever 
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6 For Kvanvig, it is another epistemic state, understanding, that bears a sort of distinctive e-value. Of course, this  thesis  too might be 
problematic. See §2.
7 Cf. Goldman & Olsson (2009) and Olsson (2007) for reliabilist defences against the Swamping Argument. For virtue-theoretic 
defences, see Greco (2009) and Sosa (2007).
adds any e-value. It is an obvious consequence that no non-factive justificatory component of 
knowledge adds any e-value—not only in instances of knowledge, but ever.  
We contend that anyone who accepts the Swamping Thesis (S4) should also accept, The 
Swamping Thesis Complement:
S4*: If the value of a property  possessed by an item is only instrumental value relative to a 
further good, and that good has already failed to be present in that item, then it can confer no 
additional value.
The kind of analogical reasoning that typically  motivates S4 also motivates S4*. For instance, 
consider a case of a lottery  where the winning ticket (drawn at noon on Friday) wins a boat. To 
make the example clean, suppose only one ticket wins. Let b-value be value related to winning the 
boat. On Thursday, our sole ticket has some positive instrumental b-value because having it is a 
means to winning the boat. On Friday, if we show the winning ticket, then, in accordance with S4, 
our sole (winning) ticket now adds no positive b-value. The idea underlying the Swamping Thesis: 
our already won boat in conjunction with the ticket that won us that boat is no more b-valuable than 
the already won boat itself. 
However, this knife cuts both ways. Suppose on Friday, that we show the losing ticket. Now, in 
accordance with S4*, it appears that we should say that our sole (losing) ticket adds no positive b-
value. The idea underlying the Swamping Thesis Complement – and arrived at by parity of 
reasoning – is that the already lost boat in conjunction with the ticket  that lost us that boat is no 
more b-valuable than the already lost boat itself.  That is to say, the conjunction is not positively b-
valuable at all. 
Because the reasoning for each is parallel, we fail to see why someone would accept S4 and not 
S4*. Notice, however, that together they lead to S4**: 
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S4**: If the value of a property  possessed by an item is only  instrumental value relative to a 
further good, and that good is already present  or has already  failed to be present in that item, then 
it can confer no additional value.
Put crudely and metaphorically, the gist of S4** is supposed to be this: after the lottery 
transaction is over (win or lose) we can throw our ticket out with the trash. 
Of course, this suggestion makes trouble in the epistemic case where the good in question is 
truth. This is because beliefs are apparently more akin to lottery  tickets that have already won or 
lost than to tickets for which we are awaiting a drawing. At least typically, beliefs are already true 
or not true. 
At this point, we are in a position to construct our main argument. Let P be an arbitrary non-
factive property of belief. The main argument is as follows:
(1) Any e-value conferred on a belief merely by that  belief having P is instrumental value 
relative to the further epistemic good of true belief. (by S2)
(2) Beliefs with the property P are either already true or already not true.8 (Assumption)
(3) Therefore, P confers no additional e-value to these beliefs. (by S4**)
(4) Therefore, no non-factive property  of belief confers any additional e-value to any of the 
beliefs that have it. (by Universal Generalization)
In other words, no non-factive property—including any sort of non-factive justification—is e-
valuable.
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8  We recognise that there is  some scope for objection to (2) as it  is currently formulated by appeal to  future contingents, which 
plausibly are not either already true or already not true. However, even if we concede this point, we could still argue to the (still 
problematic) conclusion that a non-factive property could only be an e-valuable property of future-contingent beliefs. 
This result  already sounds ridiculous, but arguably, the situation is much worse. The Swamping 
Argument from §1 can be generalized to show, for any factive property  of beliefs F, that F is not 
more e-valuable than true belief.  To do so, we replace S3 with S3*:
(S3*): If F is more e-valuable than mere true belief, then there is a non-factive component of F 
that, in instances of F, adds e-value.
One can then replace ‘K’ with ‘F’ in our version of the Swamping Argument in order to conclude 
that the e-value of F is identical to that of being true.  
Putting these results together, we get the apparently  untenable conclusion that only factive 
properties of a belief are e-valuable, and only because they are factive. In other words, the 
conclusion is that, other than the epistemic good of truth, nothing confers e-value on a belief.  This 
is not a happy conclusion.
Our response will ultimately be to reject both the Swamping Thesis and the Swamping Thesis 
Complement. However, in §3 we consider other possible responses.
3.Possible Responses
One possible response is to just accept the unhappy  conclusion that, as far as e-value is 
concerned, there is nothing e-valuable per se but truth. We don’t think this response merits serious 
consideration. Our only  comment is that, even if this were the right response, it  would only show 
that e-value is entirely  uninteresting for epistemology. It  would not show, for instance, that 
knowledge is not worthy of study.
Another possible response would be to deny any version of S3. This would not prevent the first 
(apparently  silly) result that no non-factive property is e-valuable (which does not rely on S3); we 
will put this response aside as well.
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The only possible response that we will take seriously in this section is denying S2, which we 
repeat below for the reader’s convenience:  
(S2): Any e-value conferred on a belief merely  by  that  belief having some non-factive property is 
instrumental value relative to the further epistemic good of true belief.
We will now argue that this response does not offer any real solution.
Suppose some other property  besides being true – let’s say being knowledge – were taken to be 
the fundamental epistemic good. Notice that one could substitute an analogous principle for S2 as 
follows:
 
(S2 replacement): Any e-value conferred on a belief merely by that  belief having some property 
that is not knowledge-entailing is instrumental value relative to the further epistemic good of 
knowledge.
Now, letting P now be a property of belief that isn’t  knowledge-entailing, one could subsequently 
replace our main argument in §2 with this one:
(5) Any e-value conferred on a belief merely by that belief having P is instrumental e-value 
relative to the further epistemic good of knowledge. (by S2 replacement)
(6) Beliefs with the property P are either already knowledge or already not knowledge. 
(Assumption)
(7) Therefore, P confers no additional e-value to these beliefs. (by S4**)
(8) Therefore, no property of belief that isn’t  knowledge-entailing confers any additional e-value 
to the beliefs that have it. (by Universal Generalization)
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This result is just as absurd as the prior result that  no non-factive property is e-valuable. There is 
a general problem here, the source of which appears to be that S4** simply  prevents any property 
from conferring any genuine instrumental e-value to a belief, no matter what the epistemic good is 
taken to be. Instrumental e-value is always swamped by either the presence or failed presence of the 
epistemic good.
This problem remains even if we become pluralists about the epistemic good.  For instance, 
suppose that each of true belief and knowledge were taken to be epistemic goods. Thus, e-value is 
either truth-related, i.e. t-e-value, or knowledge-related, i.e. k-e-value.  The main argument (1)-(4) 
from §2 can be modified to show that  all instrumental t-e-value is swamped by either the presence 
or failed presence of truth. The argument (5)-(8) above can be modified to show that all 
instrumental k-e-value is swamped by either the presence or failed presence of knowledge. 
Consequently, once again, there is no genuine instrumental e-value of any sort. 
In summary, S4** appears to be problematic whether or not one thinks that truth is the sole 
epistemic good. Consequently, the right  response, we think, is to reject S4** – that is to say, the 
Swamping Thesis and the Swamping Thesis Complement – whether or not one is inclined to reject 
S2.
4. A Misguided Analogy
The suggestion that it is the Swamping Thesis and its complement that we ought to reject might 
sound puzzling in light of the apparent analogical motivation for these theses, e.g. the lottery 
example from §2. For that reason, we return to the lottery example in order to show that the alleged 
analogy is problematic.
We think that, in fact, a true belief is not analogous to a winning lottery ticket that has been 
shown so that the prize – in our example, the boat – is now secured.  Having a true belief is, if 
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anything, more like holding a winning lottery  ticket after the drawing, but before showing it to gain 
the prize in such a way that  the boat is now in one’s possession. Before the winning lottery ticket 
has been shown and the prize is secured, the winning lottery ticket continues to have instrumental b-
value. Indeed, it continues to have instrumental b-value even if one knows that  the lottery ticket is a 
winning ticket. One has to complete a transaction in order to take final possession of the boat before 
the winning lottery ticket loses its instrumental b-value.
This line of thought leads us to think that a justified true belief may well continue to have 
instrumental e-value indefinitely. Although it  is a ‘winning’ belief, there is never a point at which 
the belief is ‘shown’ and the prize is now ‘secured’ because the belief ‘transaction’ is now 
completed. It is useful to remember that beliefs are ongoing states, not events with a past terminus.9 
Just as the work of maintaining a clean house, the work of properly  managing a belief is never over. 
One continues to have to manage the belief properly long after its acquisition; one might very well 
reflect on it today, and ultimately  give it  up tomorrow. ‘Winning’ for a belief is something ongoing 
rather than something that is, at some point, completed. Consequently, there is nothing obviously 
absurd about thinking that there continues to be instrumental e-value even when the epistemic good 
is already present.
Nor is there anything obviously absurd about thinking that there continues to be instrumental e-
value even when the epistemic good has already failed to be present. A person with a justified false 
belief might be taking appropriate means to the epistemic good of truth even if they continue to fall 
short of possessing it, and moreover, could not possess it by those means. This is not very different 
from us holding a lottery  ticket for the boat when, unbeknownst to us, the lottery  is over and our 
ticket has not  been drawn. It would be silly  of us to throw our ticket in the garbage under the 
condition that, as a matter of fact, it is a losing ticket if we haven’t recognized the condition as such 
(because, say, we weren’t at the drawing and are waiting to hear to the news). It only  makes sense to 
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9 Chrisman (forthcoming) and Williamson (2000), 35.
throw out the ticket because it  is a losing ticket, which implies that we do recognize the ticket as 
losing. So long as the loss is not yet clear to us, the ticket continues to have instrumental b-value for 
us. In the same way, so long as a person has not gained some further reason to suspect that their 
belief is not true, there is nothing obviously wrong with thinking that the belief has instrumental e-
value for them even if it is, in fact, not true. For example, suppose Serena previously believed her 
neighbor was home because she saw the front light on. However, she then learned (conclusively) 
that the neighbor has moved to the Hamptons, but leaves the light on permanently  to deter intruders. 
Thus, Serena is not justified anymore (given what she knows) in believing the neighbor is home. 
We contend that it is entirely plausible to think that Serena’s previous belief was instrumentally  e-
valuable, but would not have continued to be had she (stubbornly and unreasonably) not given it up 
after her recent discovery. 
More generally, our suggestion is that if a false belief is justified, the subject won’t be aware that 
it is false, so it can easily  be instrumentally e-valuable. On the other hand, suppose that  the subject 
is aware that the belief is false or might easily  be false. Then, the instrumental e-value of 
justification is not swamped because there is no justification present, the instrumental e-value of 
which could be swamped. So, the instrumental e-value of justification is never (as opposed to 
always) swamped by falsity.
5.Concluding Remarks
In this paper, our principal suggestion is that the Swamping Problem is, in fact, a pseudo 
problem: the Swamping Argument fails to provide any reason for worrying that  knowledge might 
not be more e-valuable than mere true belief. (To be clear: we concede that there might be other 
problems concerning the e-value of knowledge; we simply contend that they are not related to 
swamping.)10
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10 Consider Pritchard’s (2009b) discussion of the secondary and tertiary value problems.
The Swamping Problem arises primarily from the Swamping Thesis. However, closer inspection 
casts serious doubt on the Swamping Thesis. We see no more reason to believe in swamping by  the 
presence of the good than to believe in swamping by the failure of that presence.  However, 
believing in both kinds of swamping leads to the conclusion that there is no instrumental e-value no 
matter what one takes the epistemic good to be). This conclusion is not plausible. We have also 
suggested that analogical motivation for the Swamping Thesis is poor. It is worth remembering that, 
even if provocative, analogical reasoning is notoriously fallacious.
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